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Abstract.	  This	  paper	  analyses	  how	  the	  interaction	  between	  social	  institutions	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  actor’s	  
strategies	   and	   interests	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   is	   shaping	   European	   integration	   in	   research	   policy.	   We	  
specifically	   focus	   on	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   different	   conceptions	   of	   European	   integration	  
(logics)	  on	  the	  emerging	  landscape	  of	  research	  funding	  programs	  jointly	  managed	  by	  the	  European	  Union	  
(EU)	  and	  National	  States	  (joint	  programs).	  Our	  results	  display	  the	  central	  role	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  logic	  
of	  coordination	  by	  the	  EU;	  it	  created	  a	  breeding	  ground	  for	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  programs	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  
time,	  allowed	  to	  make	  the	   integration	  model	  more	   flexible	  and	  acceptable	   to	  National	  States	   (as	   funding	  
became	   only	   virtually	   integrated).	  Most	   newly	   created	   programs	  were	   characterized	   by	   largely	   symbolic	  
commitments	   and	   very	   small	   budgets,	   while	   stronger	   commitments	   had	   to	   be	   constructed	   through	  
successive	  steps	  of	  integration.	  This	  process	  was	  highly	  selective	  and	  dependent	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  strong	  
interests	   from	  the	   research	  community;	  additional	   funding	   from	  the	  EU	  was	  critical	   to	  ensure	  stability	  of	  
national	   commitments.	   Further,	  National	   States	   by	   large	   delegated	   to	   independent	   funding	   agencies	   the	  
management	   of	   national	   participations:	   delegation	   allowed	   to	   achieve	   greater	   homogeneity	   among	  
national	   participants,	   but	   also	   to	  decouple	  decisions	   to	  participate	   (driven	  by	   compliance	   to	   institutional	  
pressures)	   from	   the	   level	   of	   resources	   to	   be	   committed	   (driven	   by	   national	   interests).	  While	   in	   the	   year	  
2000,	  the	  European	  Research	  Area	  (ERA)	  strategy	  of	  coordinating	  national	  research	  policies	  was	  largely	  an	  
empty	  concept,	  our	  case	  study	  shows	  how	  in	  the	  following	  decade,	  it	  was	  filled	  in	  with	  specific	  experiences	  
and	   practices,	   led	   to	   the	   redefinition	   of	   actor’s	   understanding	   of	   European	   integration	   and	   roles	   in	  
European	  research	  policies	  and,	  ultimately,	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  original	  models	  of	  integration.	  
Keywords.	   European	   integration,	   institutional	   logics,	   actor’s	   interests,	   European	   research	   policy,	   joint	  
research	  programs	  
1 Introduction	  
Since	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  European	  Research	  Area	  (ERA)	  strategy	  in	  2000,	  increasing	  the	  integration	  level	  of	  
European	  research	  has	  become	  a	  central	  focus	  of	  European	  policy	  (Luukkonen	  and	  Nedeva	  2010),	  mirroring	  
similar	  processes	   in	  other	  policy	  domains	   (Marks,	  Scharpf,	  Schmitter	  and	  Streeck	  1996).	  This	   shift	   can	  be	  
interpreted	  as	  an	  attempt	   to	  overcome	   the	   limitations	  of	   the	  policies	  developed	   in	   the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  
which	  focused	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  European	  Framework	  Programs	  (FP;	  Banchoff	  2002,	  Trondal	  2002).	  
It	  can	  also	  be	  interpreted	  as	  the	  recognition	  that	  a	  model	  of	   integration,	  where	  all	  competences	  (and	  the	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relative	   budgets)	   are	   transferred	   to	   the	   European	   level,	   was	   not	   endorsed	   by	   national	   actors	   and	   thus	  
coordination	  of	  national	  research	  policies	  was	  required	  (Edler,	  Kuhlmann	  and	  Behrens	  2003).	  
In	  the	  following	  years,	  instruments	  towards	  integration	  were	  introduced	  in	  different	  layers	  of	  the	  research	  
policy	  system.	  In	  the	  policy	  layer,	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Open	  Method	  of	  Coordination	  (Borrás	  and	  Jacobson	  
2004)	   aimed	   at	   coordinating	   European	   and	   national	   research	   policies,	   while	   in	   the	   performers	   layer,	  
European	  networks	  of	  Excellence	  have	  been	  launched	  to	  structure	  research	  fields	  (Luukkonen,	  Nedeva	  and	  
Barré	   2006)	   and	   initiatives	   have	   been	   undertaken	   to	   coordinate	   large-­‐scale	   research	   infrastructures	  
through	  the	  European	  Strategy	  Forum	  for	  Research	  Infrastructure.	  
This	  paper	  aims	  to	  investigate	  integration	  processes	  in	  the	  funding	  layer	  –concerning	  the	  establishment	  of	  
what	  we	  call	   joint	  programs,	   i.e.	  research	  funding	  programs	  which	  are	  jointly	  managed	  by	  more	  than	  one	  
country	   (possibly	  with	   the	   participation	   of	   the	   European	  Union).	   Historically,	   the	   first	   examples	   of	   these	  
programs	   were	   created	   in	   the	   1950s	   and	   60s	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   critical	   mass	   in	   domains	   where	   the	  
resources	  of	   individual	  European	  countries	  were	  not	  sufficient	   to	  compete	  with	   the	  United	  States,	   like	   in	  
nuclear	  energy	  (Euratom	  in	  1957)	  and	  space	  (European	  Space	  Agency	  –	  ESA	  -­‐	  in	  1975);	  they	  were	  based	  on	  
international	   treaties	   and	   managed	   by	   an	   international	   agency	   receiving	   resources	   from	   participating	  
countries	  and	  funding	  directly	  national	  performers.	  From	  the	  1970s,	  a	  second	  set	  of	  programs	  was	  created,	  
with	   a	   broader	   scientific	   scope	   and	   a	   focus	   on	   networking	   (Gronbaek	   2003);	   the	   design	   and	   selection	  
functions	   were	   delegated	   to	   a	   supranational	   agency,	   while	   funding	   was	   managed	   at	   the	   national	   level	  
without	   trans-­‐border	   flows	   of	   funding.	   The	   European	   Cooperation	   in	   Science	   and	   Technology	   program	  
(COST;	  created	   in	  1971),	   the	  European	  Science	  Foundation	   (ESF;	  1974)	  and	  Eureka	   (1987)	  both	  belong	   to	  
this	  group	  (Guzzetti	  1995).	  
Since	  2000,	  the	  European	  Union	  (EU)	  has	  introduced	  a	  number	  of	  schemes	  promoting	  cooperation	  between	  
national	   funding	  policies.	  As	  part	  of	  European	  Framework	  Programs,	  the	  EU	  supported	  so-­‐called	  ERA-­‐NET	  
initiatives,	  which	  have	  been	  conceived	  as	  variable	  geometry	  instruments	  for	  coordinating	  national	  funding	  
policies;	  further,	  article	  185	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  Treaty	  allows	  the	  EU	  to	  participate	  and	  co-­‐fund	  research	  
funding	   initiatives	   jointly	   undertaken	   by	   several	   member	   States	   (so-­‐called	   Article	   185	   initiatives);	   more	  
recently,	   Joint	  Technology	   Initiatives	   (JTI)	  have	  been	   launched	  as	   long-­‐term	  public-­‐private	  partnerships	   in	  
order	   to	   support	   large-­‐scale	  multinational	   research	   in	   areas	   of	  major	   interest	   to	   European	   industry	   and	  
society	  (Brummer,	  Konnola	  and	  Sato	  2008).	  
We	  specifically	  deal	  with	   two	  characteristics	  of	   integration	   in	   joint	  programs,	   their	  distributed	  and	  multi-­‐
actor	  setting	  on	  the	  one	  side,	  the	  presence	  of	  different	  institutional	  logics	  (Thornton,	  Ocasio	  and	  Lounsbury	  
2012)	  on	  how	  integration	  should	  take	  place	  on	  the	  other.	  
Studies	   of	   European	   policies	   have	   recognized	   the	   multi-­‐level	   and	   multi-­‐actor	   nature	   of	   European	  
governance	   (Kuhlmann	   2001,	   Edler	   and	   Kuhlmann	   2011)	   and	   that	   actors	   have	   different	   interests	   and	  
identities	  which	   interact	  during	   the	  policy	  process;	  hence	  both	  the	  existence	  of	  a	   ‘change	  champion’	  and	  
the	   ability	   to	   overcome	   resistance	   from	   key	   actors	   is	   required	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   European	  
instruments	  (Nedeva	  2012).	  In	  this	  respect,	  joint	  programs	  represent	  a	  highly	  decentralized	  setting	  where,	  
under	  the	  variable	  geometry	  approach	   introduced	  by	  the	  European	  Commission,	  actor’s	  networks	  can	  be	  
flexibly	  constructed	  around	  specific	  programs	  and	  interests.	  
In	   turn,	   studies	   in	   the	   neo-­‐institutionalist	   tradition	   consider	   social	   institutions	   to	   be	   central	   to	   policy	  
processes;	  they	  frame	  and	  shape	  actor’s	  behavior	  (March	  and	  Olsen	  1984,	  Bulmer	  1994),	  while	  also	  driving	  
resistance	  to	  change	  and	  path-­‐dependency	  (Pierson	  2004).	  These	  studies	  underline	  the	  lasting	  heritage	  of	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institutional	   structures,	   revealing	   that	   EU	   research	   policy	   was	   locked	   into	   a	   specific	   model	   and	   actor’s	  
constellation	  around	  the	  FP	  programs	  (Banchoff	  2002).	  
Bridging	  these	  traditions	  towards	  a	  more	  systematic	  understanding	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  institutions	  
and	   actors	   in	   shaping	   European	  policies	   is	   clearly	   relevant	   (Aspinwall	   and	   Schneider	   2000;	   Caporaso	   and	  
Sweet	  2001).	  
We	   focus	   on	   the	   implications	   of	   institutional	   pluralism,	   i.e.	   the	   presence	   of	   fundamentally	   different	  
conceptions	   (logics)	   concerning	  what	   European	   integration	   should	   be	   at	   both	   a	   general	   level	   (Schmitter	  
1996)	  and	  in	  research	  and	  innovation	  policy	  (Kuhlmann	  2001).	  These	  suggest	  different	  models	  concerning	  
the	  competences	  to	  be	  transferred	  at	  the	  European	  level,	  details	  on	  how	  joint	  activities	  should	  organized,	  
and	  the	  role	  of	  national	  actors	  (Edler	  2009,	  Barré,	  Henriques,	  Pontikakis	  and	  Weber	  2012).	  
Accordingly,	  joint	  programs	  represent	  an	  ideal	  setting	  where	  competition	  between	  institutional	  logics	  and	  
their	   interaction	  with	   actor’s	   strategies	   can	   be	   observed.	   Unlike	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   funding	   agency,	   entry	  
costs	  are	   relatively	   low	  and	  programs	  can	  be	   light	   settings	  which	  do	  not	  necessarily	   require	  high	   level	  of	  
investment	  and	  long-­‐term	  commitments.	  However,	  selection	  and	  retention	  are	  expected	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  
level	  of	  endorsement	  by	  relevant	  actors	  –	  specifically	  those	  who	  control	  a	  significant	  share	  of	  the	  research	  
funding	  budget	  –generating	  a	  situation	  where	  growth	  in	  terms	  of	  budget	  is	  highly	  selective.	  
We	   address	   the	   following	   questions:	   first,	   do	  we	   observe	   the	   emergence	   of	   patterns	   in	   joint	   programs,	  
which	  can	  be	  related	  to	  underlying	  models	  of	  European	  integration?	  More	  interestingly,	  to	  which	  extent	  do	  
actor’s	   interests	   lead	   to	   hybrid	   programs	   combining	   different	   models?	   Second,	   can	   we	   understand	   the	  
program’s	  selection	  and	  retention	  process	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  characteristics	  of	  
the	   institutional	   model	   and	   actor’s	   interests?	   Can	   we	   identify	   some	   characteristics	   that	   lead	   individual	  
programs	  to	  grow	  to	  a	  sizeable	  budget?	  Finally,	  can	  we	  anticipate	  implications	  for	  the	  development	  of	  joint	  
programs	  and	  for	  the	  integration	  of	  national	  research	  policies?	  
Our	  investigation	  is	  based	  on	  a	  dataset	  covering	  roughly	  90	  programs	  in	  11	  European	  countries,	   including	  
information	   on	   their	   organization,	   budget,	   national	   participation	   for	   the	   year	   2009,	   as	   well	   as	   data	   on	  
budgets	  since	  2000.	  
The	  paper	   is	  organized	  as	   follows.	  Section	  2	  develops	  our	   theoretical	   framework	  around	   the	   institutional	  
logics	  approach	  and	  introduces	  our	  hypotheses	  and	  research	  questions.	  Section	  3	  describes	  the	  dataset	  and	  
the	  methodology,	  while	  section	  4	  presents	  the	  results	  concerning	  characteristics	  of	  joint	  programs,	  patterns	  
of	  actor’s	  participation,	  and	  the	  evolution	  of	  budgets.	  Section	  5	  discusses	  of	   the	  results	   in	   the	  context	  of	  
European	  research	  policy.	  
2 Integrating	  institutions	  and	  actors	  in	  the	  European	  context	  
While	  early	   sociological	   institutionalism	  argued	   that	  actors’	  behavior	   is	  driven	  by	  compliance	   to	   codes	  of	  
appropriate	  conduct	  provided	  by	  social	   institutions	  rather	  than	  by	  their	   interests	  –	  more	  recent	  work	  has	  
attempted	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  balanced	  account	  of	  agency	  (Greenwood,	  Oliver,	  Sahlin	  and	  Suddaby	  2008).	  
The	  central	  role	  of	  institutions	  in	  framing	  and	  enabling	  behavior	  is	  recognized	  –	  actors	  have	  at	  their	  disposal	  
a	   limited	  set	  of	  culturally	  conceivable	  and	   legitimate	  choices,	  while	  their	   interests	  are	  themselves	  socially	  
constructed.	   However,	   especially	   when	   there	   is	   ambiguity	   and	   pluralism	   in	   the	   institutional	   context,	  
compliance	   is	   likely	   but	   not	   automatic,	   and	   actor’s	   responses	   are	   driven	   by	   their	   characteristics	   and	  
interests	  as	  well	  (Thornton,	  Ocasio	  and	  Lounsbury	  2012).	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We	  conceive	  the	  relationships	  between	  institutions	  and	  actors	  as	  a	  recursive	  one,	  where	  institutions	  frame	  
and	  embed	   current	   actor’s	  behavior,	  while	   actors	   engage	  actively	   in	   the	   institutional	  design	   shaping	  and	  
reproducing	   those	   institutions	   which	  will	   frame	   their	   future	   behavior	   (Scott	   2008,	  Mahoney	   and	   Thelen	  
2010).	  We	  are	  interested	  in	  explaining	  how	  –	  from	  social	  norms	  and	  rules	  concerning	  European	  integration	  
–	   specific	   models	   for	   joint	   programs	   have	   been	   constructed,	   as	   a	   part	   of	   the	   broader	   process	   of	  
institutionalization	  of	  the	  European	  space	  (Sweet,	  Fligstein	  and	  Sandholtz	  2001).	  
2.1 Institutional	  logics	  in	  European	  integration	  
Sociological	  institutionalism	  comes	  up	  with	  a	  thick	  conception	  of	  institutions,	  which	  not	  only	  include	  rules	  
constraining	  behavior,	  but	  also	  cultural	  and	  cognitive	  models	  shaping	  the	  way	  actors	  represent	  the	  reality	  
and	   defining	   legitimate	   practices	   (Meyer	   and	   Rowan	   1977).	   Early	   institutional	   theory	   emphasized	   the	  
internal	  coherency	  of	  institutional	  systems	  and	  their	  stability	  across	  time,	  driving	  to	  isomorphism	  (DiMaggio	  
and	  Powell	  1983).	  
More	  recently,	  it	  has	  been	  recognized	  that	  most	  organizational	  fields	  are	  characterized	  by	  the	  coexistence	  
of	   different	   institutional	   logics,	   stipulating	   alternative	  ways	  of	   organizing	   social	   life	   (Friedland	   and	  Alford	  
1991).	   Institutional	   pluralism	   has	   key	   implications	   for	   agency,	   practices,	   and	   institutional	   change	   (Scott	  
2008).	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  co-­‐existence	  of	  different	  logics	  creates	  ambiguity	  concerning	  behavior,	  leading	  
to	   hybridization	   and	   to	   the	   continued	   emergence	   of	   new	   practices	   (Lounsbury	   2007;	   Kraatz	   and	   Block	  
2008).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  prevalence	  of	  competing	  logics	  in	  a	  field	  will	  be	  historically	  contingent	  and	  is	  
likely	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  a	  specific	  actor’s	  constellations,	  creating	  room	  for	  institutional	  agency	  (Thornton	  and	  
Ocasio	  1999).	  
A	  useful	  way	  to	  analyze	   implications	  of	   institutional	  pluralism	  is	   to	  devise	  a	  number	  of	   ideal	   types,	  which	  
identify	  the	  main	  conceptual	  alternatives	  available	  to	  actors	  (Thornton	  and	  Ocasio	  2008).	  Types	  are	  not	  just	  
cultural	   frames	  of	   reference,	   they	   also	   include	  normative	   and	   regulatory	  dimensions,	   like	   stipulations	  on	  
how	  joint	  programs	  should	  be	  organized,	  which	  functions	  should	  be	  integrated,	  how	  their	  budget	  should	  be	  
managed,	  and	   thus	   specify	  general	  models	  of	   integration	   for	   the	  domain	  at	  hand.	   Importantly,	   types	  are	  
analytical	  models	  and	  not	  descriptions	  of	  observed	  programs,	  even	   if	  empirical	  data	  might	  provide	  useful	  
information	  to	  design	  them.	  
We	  construct	   three	   ideal	   types	   for	   joint	  programs	  building	  on	  alternative	  conceptualizations	  of	  European	  
integration	  (Edler	  and	  Flanagan	  2011;	  Schmitter	  1996).	  
The	  integration	  logic	  refers	  to	  the	  transfer	  of	  competencies	  to	  a	  higher	  institutional	  level	  (table	  1).	  This	  type	  
is	   related	   to	   accounts	   of	   European	   integration	   as	   transferring	   competences	   from	   the	   national	   to	   the	  
European	  level,	  by	  creating	  a	  common	  governance	  structure	  (the	  State/federation	  model).	  In	  research	  and	  
innovation	  policy,	  it	  corresponds	  to	  a	  centralized	  scenario,	  where	  decision-­‐making	  arenas	  are	  established	  at	  
the	  European	  level	  and	  the	  role	  of	  national	  policy	  is	  strongly	  reduced	  (Kuhlmann	  2001).	  
Three	  main	  rationales	  underpin	  this	  logic:	  first,	  achieving	  critical	  mass	  in	  domains	  where	  national	  programs	  
cannot;	   second,	   promoting	   competition	   among	   research	   performers	   by	   enlarging	   the	  market;	   and	   third,	  
favoring	  research	  collaboration	  through	  transnational	  projects.	  In	  terms	  of	  program	  organization,	  this	  type	  
foresees	  the	  transfer	  of	  all	  program	  functions,	   including	   funding,	   to	  a	  supranational	  entity.	  The	  origins	  of	  
this	  logic	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  early	  steps	  of	  European	  integration;	  it’s	  ancestors	  are	  EURATOM	  (1957)	  
and	  the	  European	  Space	  Agency	  (1975).	  
At	   the	   other	   extreme,	   collaboration	   implies	   that	   national	   partners	   work	   together	   on	   a	   specific	   funding	  
scheme,	  without	  delegating	  decisions	  concerning	  policies	  to	  a	  supranational	  body.	  This	  logic	  is	  related	  to	  a	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decentralized	  scenario	  of	  European	  integration	  (“condominio	  model”;	  Schmitter	  1996;	  Kuhlmann	  2001).	  Its	  
rationale	   is	   to	   strengthen	   the	   national	   research	   basis	   through	   collaboration.	   This	   logic	   foresees	  
collaboration	   between	   national	   funding	   bodies	   on	   specific	   activities,	   with	   each	   retaining	   control	   over	  
evaluation,	  selection,	  and	  funding	  decisions,	  but	  matching	  takes	  place	  by	  funding	  projects	  selected	  by	  both	  
parties.	  Collaboration	  is	  ad	  hoc	  (for	  a	  specific	  activity)	  and	  one-­‐off	  (for	  a	  limited	  time).	  The	  first	  ancestor	  is	  
the	  French-­‐German	  cooperation	  in	  transport	  research	  DEUFRAKO	  (1978).	  
Coordination	  means	  bringing	  together	  different	  elements	  to	  form	  a	  lasting	  relationship	  (Edler	  and	  Flanagan	  
2011).	   This	   goes	   farther	   than	   collaboration	   towards	   a	  mutual	   alignment	   of	   funding	   policies;	   to	   this	   aim,	  
some	   forms	  of	   integration	  might	   take	  place	  –	   like	   the	   creation	  of	   joint	  bodies	  or	   consortia	   -­‐	  but	  without	  
implying	   that	   these	   take	   over	   national	   competences.	   This	   logic	   is	   related	   to	   scenarios	   of	   European	  
integration	  emphasizing	   the	  diversity	  of	  national	  and	   regional	   spaces	  and	  conceptualizing	  S&T	  policies	  as	  
multi-­‐actors	  and	  multi-­‐level	  spaces,	  where	  National	  States,	  the	  EU,	  and	  funding	  agencies	  interact,	  compete,	  
and	  agree	  on	   joint	  actions	   (Kuhlmann	  2001).	  The	   rationale	   is	   to	  value	  and	  exploit	   the	  complementarities	  
between	  national	  systems	  and	  to	  seek	  coordination	  where	  it	  provides	  added	  value.	  In	  funding	  policies,	  this	  
logic	   is	   related	  –	  but	  not	   limited	  to	   -­‐	   joint	  programming	   initiatives	  by	  the	  European	  Union,	   like	  ERA-­‐NETs,	  
adopting	  a	  variable	  geometry	  approach	  where	  national	  states	  can	  decide	  levels	  of	  commitments	  (European	  
Commission	  2008).	  
[table	  1	  about	  here]	  
2.2 Shaping	  the	  domain	  of	  joint	  programs	  
Pressures	  for	  the	  development	  of	  joint	  programs	  originate	  from	  broader	  internationalization	  tendencies	  in	  
the	  research	  system	  itself,	   in	  economy	  and	  in	  society	  (Nedeva	  2012).	  This	  includes	  research	  communities,	  
given	   the	   internationalization	   of	   research	   and	   the	   need	   of	   achieving	   critical	   mass	   in	   specific	   domains;	  
industry,	  given	  the	  internationalization	  of	  economy	  and	  the	  need	  to	  achieve	  better	  European	  collaboration	  
in	   technology	   development	   to	   respond	   to	   competition	   from	   the	   United	   States,	   Japan	   and,	   recently,	  
emerging	  countries;	  finally,	  public	  administration	  and	  society,	  since	  European	  integration	  also	  requires	  the	  
development	  of	  common	  solutions	  and	  standards.	  Actors	  in	  these	  fields	  are	  then	  expect	  to	  exert	  pressures	  
on	   research	   policies	   in	   order	   to	   introduce	   funding	   schemes	   which	   respond	   to	   their	   internationalization	  
needs	  in	  their	  respective	  domains	  (figure	  1).	  
Further,	  once	  some	  level	  of	   institutionalization	  of	  European	  policies	   is	  achieved	  (in	  research	  policy	  and	   in	  
general),	   European	   institutions	  will	   themselves	   exert	   pressures	   for	   further	   Europeanization	  both	   through	  
normative	   pressures	   and	   through	   specific	   actors	   interested	   to	   strengthen	   the	   European	   level,	   like	   the	  
European	  Commission	  and	  European	  funding	  agencies	  (Sweet,	  Fligstein	  and	  Sandholtz	  2001),	  thus	  leading	  
to	  self-­‐reinforcing	  mechanisms	  and	  path	  dependency.	  
	  [figure	  1	  about	  here]	  
To	  respond,	  actors	  are	  expected	  to	  resort	  to	  the	  legitimate	  models	  available	  in	  the	  domain.	  This	  process	  will	  
not	   simply	   imply	   adopting	   ideal	   types:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   ideal	   types	   do	   not	   fully	   specify	   how	   programs	  
should	   be	   organized	   and	   managed	   –	   the	   integration	   type	   requires	   transfer	   of	   competences	   to	   the	  
supranational	   level,	  but	  does	  not	  specify	  which	  kind	  of	  supranational	  structure	  should	  be	  created.	  On	  the	  
other	  hand,	  the	  presence	  of	  different	   legitimate	  types	  allows	  actors	  to	  blend	  characteristics	  of	  more	  than	  
one	  type	  if	  this	  bears	  advantages	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  program	  functionality,	  matching	  their	  interests	  and	  identity,	  
and	  getting	  the	  endorsement	  of	  other	  actors.	  Accordingly:	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H1.	  We	  expect	   that	   joint	  programs	  can	  be	   referred	   to	   the	   three	   ideal	   types	   identified,	  but	  we	  also	  expect	  
that	  hybrid	  programs	  blending	  characteristics	  of	  more	  than	  one	  type	  will	  emerge.	  
2.3 Participation	  profiles	  and	  actor’s	  roles	  
We	   expect	   variations	   in	   the	   responses	   of	   individual	   actors	   following	   different	  mechanisms	   (Greenwood,	  
Oliver,	  Sahlin	  and	  Suddaby	  2008).	  
First,	  actors	  occupy	  different	  positions	  in	  organizational	  fields	  implying	  different	  roles,	  normative	  pressures,	  
constraints,	  and	  positions	  in	  the	  actor	  networks	  (Davis	  and	  Greve	  1997).	  Second,	  they	  will	  try	  securing	  the	  
critical	   resources	   required	   for	   their	   operations	   (Pfeffer	   and	   Salancik	   1978)	   and	   protecting	   their	   technical	  
core	   from	   institutional	   requests	   which	   run	   counter	   their	   interests	   -­‐	   decoupling,	   i.e.	   adopting	   purely	  
symbolic	  actions	  might	  not	  be	  always	  possible	   (Meyer	  and	  Rowan	  1977).	  Third,	  compliance	   is	  more	   likely	  
when	   institutional	   pressures	   are	   aligned	  with	   the	   actor’s	   history,	  mission,	   and	   norms	   (Kostova	   and	   Roth	  
2002,	  Greenwood,	  Oliver,	  Sahlin	  and	  Suddaby	  2008):	  thus	  actors	  will	  be	  selective	  towards	  those	  programs	  
aligned	  with	  their	  identity	  and	  mission.	  
We	   specifically	   focus	   on	   political	   actors	   –	   the	   European	   Union	   and	   National	   States	   –	   and	   on	   funding	  
agencies.	   Traditionally,	   their	   relationship	   has	   been	   represented	   in	   terms	   of	   delegation,	   with	   the	   State	  
defining	  policy	  goals	  and	  agencies	  executing	  implementation	  tasks	  (Braun	  2003b).	  Hence,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  
differentiate	  the	  analysis	  by	  task	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  their	  respective	  roles	  in	  joint	  programs.	  
Launching	  a	  program	   is	  a	   largely	  political	  and	  symbolic	  act,	  but	  does	  not	  necessarily	   require	  a	   significant	  
investment	   of	   resources.	   Accordingly	   it	   should	   be	   driven	   by	   two	   main	   rationales:	   promoting	   actor’s	  
representation	  of	  European	  integration	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  signaling	  compliance	  to	  the	  institutional	  pressures	  
the	  actor	  is	  subject	  to	  on	  the	  other	  hand.	  We	  expect	  that	  political	  authorities	  are	  the	  main	  actor,	  with	  the	  
European	   Union	   launching	   programs	   near	   to	   the	   integration	   type,	   and	   National	   States	   near	   to	   the	  
cooperation	   type	   (as	   they	   are	   rooted	   in	   a	   tradition	   of	   national	   sovereignty	   and	   promoting	   national	  
interests).	  Since	  the	  tendency	  of	  agencies	  to	  behave	  as	  policy	  actors	  on	  their	  own	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  
especially	  for	  research	  councils	  (Slipersaeter,	  Lepori	  and	  Dinges	  2007),	  we	  foresee	  some	  role	  of	  the	  latter	  in	  
launching	  programs	  as	  well.	  
Joining	  an	  existing	  program	   is	  a	   less	  engaging	  decision	  on	   the	  symbolic	  and	   financial	   side.	  For	  European-­‐
level	   initiatives,	   the	   joining	   of	   additional	   countries	   increases	   their	   legitimacy	   even	   without	   financial	  
commitments.	   Accordingly,	   a	   share	   of	   purely	   symbolic	   participation	   (without	   a	   budget)	   is	   also	   expected	  
since	  this	  would	  be	  also	   in	   the	   interest	  of	   the	  other	  participants.	  The	  number	  of	  countries	   is	  expected	  to	  
grow	   when	   programs	   are	   more	   established	   (for	   example	   having	   a	   supranational	   agency)	   and	   when	  
commitment	   from	   the	   EU	   is	   strong	   (top-­‐up	   funding)	   –both	   due	   to	   isomorphic	   pressures	   and	   national	  
interests.	  
For	   bilateral	   programs,	   joining	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   free-­‐riding	   if	   no	   additional	   resources	   are	  
provided;	  since	   it	  does	  entail	  advantages	   in	  terms	  of	   legitimacy	  –	  bilateral	  program	  do	  not	  need	  covering	  
most	  European	  countries.	  Accordingly,	  we	  expect	  this	  behavior	  to	  be	  discouraged	  and,	  thus,	  less	  frequent.	  
Since	   the	   delegation	   of	   program	   management	   to	   independent	   agencies	   is	   a	   general	   phenomenon	  
characterizing	  research	  policies	  in	  European	  countries	  (Lepori,	  Dinges,	  Reale,	  Slipersaeter,	  Theves	  and	  Van	  
den	   Besselaar	   2007,	   Nedeva	   2012),	   we	   expect	   that	   the	  management	   of	   national	   participation	   is	   largely	  
delegated	   to	   agencies.	   Delegation	   might	   also	   allow	   national	   states	   to	   decouple	   symbolic	   behavior	  
(participation)	   from	   effective	   commitments	   (resources),	   by	   leaving	   the	   decision	   concerning	   the	   level	   of	  
participation	  and	  budget	  to	  the	  agency.	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Moreover,	   funding	   agencies	   tend	   to	   be	   specialized	   by	   research	   policy	   goals	   -­‐	   distinguishing	   between	  
science-­‐oriented	  agencies	   (research	  councils),	   innovation-­‐oriented	  agencies,	   and	   sector	  agencies	   focusing	  
on	   policy	   domains	   (Lepori,	   Dinges,	   Reale,	   Slipersaeter,	   Theves	   and	   Van	   den	   Besselaar	   2007):	   thus,	   the	  
choice	   of	   the	   agency	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   driven	   by	   the	   specific	   program	   domain.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   bilateral	  
programs	   are	   promoted	   by	   specific	   national	   actors	   (research	  ministries,	   funding	   agencies)	   and	   thus	   it	   is	  
expected	  that	  they	  play	  a	  stronger	  role	  in	  managing	  participation	  as	  well.	  
Accordingly:	  
H2.	   Actors	   display	   different	   roles	   and	   participation	   profiles	   to	   programs	   which	   are	   revealing	   of	   the	  
correspondence	  between	  their	  interests	  and	  position	  in	  the	  field	  and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  programs.	  
2.4 Resources	  and	  the	  growth	  dynamics	  of	  joint	  programs	  
While	  we	   anticipate	   that	   establishing	   and	   participating	   in	   joint	   programs	  might	   be	   largely	   symbolic	   –	   to	  
demonstrate	  compliance	  and	  witness	  on-­‐going	  developments,	  the	  decision	  to	  commit	  financial	  resources	  is	  
expected	  to	  be	  more	  selective	  and	  related	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  strong	  interests,	  since	  budgets	  are	  scarce	  and	  
critical	  for	  achieving	  policy	  goals	  (Braun	  2003a).	  Accordingly,	  	  
H3.	   We	   expect	   a	   very	   skewed	   distribution	   level	   of	   resources	   among	   joint	   programs	   with	   some	   types	   of	  
programs	  displaying	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  budget,	  as	  well	  as	  stronger	  growth	  with	  time.	  
First,	  a	  significant	  investment	  of	  resources	  in	  joint	  programs	  depends	  critically	  on	  mutual	  commitments	  by	  
National	  States	  –	   if	  only	  a	  single	  country	  commits	  resources,	   the	  program	  goals	  cannot	  be	  achieved.	  One	  
option	   would	   be	   legal	   commitments	   (for	   example	   through	   international	   treaties),	   but	   this	   will	   be	  
exceptional,	   as	   National	   States	   would	   then	   lose	   control	   of	   their	   budgets.	   Softer	   commitments	   can	   be	  
sustained	   by	   social	   norms	   promoting	   cooperation	   associated	   with	   the	   integration	   (and	   partially	  
coordination)	  logic,	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  lasting	   integration	  structures	  (for	  example	  agencies),	  and	  finally,	  by	  
financial	  incentives	  generated	  by	  EU	  top-­‐up	  funding.	  We	  then	  expect	  large	  programs	  in	  terms	  of	  budget,	  to	  
be	  associated	  with	  these	  characteristics.	  
Second,	   joint	  programs	  cannot	  be	  established	  unilaterally	  by	  a	  single	  actor	  –	   like	  the	  European	  Union	  for	  
the	  European	  Research	  Council	  (Nedeva	  2012)	  -­‐	  ,	  but	  requires	  mutual	  commitments	  between	  the	  European	  
Union,	  National	  States,	  and	  funding	  agencies.	  Given	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  uncertainty,	  this	  negotiation	  process	  
is	  likely	  to	  start	  with	  low	  levels	  of	  integration	  and	  commitments	  of	  resources,	  and	  then,	  if	  it	  works	  and	  trust	  
can	  be	   constructed,	  ultimately	   the	  process	  will	  move	   towards	   stronger	   forms	  of	   integration	  and	  a	   larger	  
amount	  of	  resources.	  We	  then	  expect	  that	  successive	  steps	  of	  integration	  characterize	  successful	  programs.	  
Third,	   moving	   along	   this	   path	   should	   depend	   on	   two	   conditions:	   first,	   the	   successful	   completion	   of	   the	  
previous	   phases	   of	   integration,	   in	   terms	   of	   national	   commitments	   and	   the	   functionality	   of	   the	   program.	  
Second,	  the	  presence	  of	  strong	  interests	  (“change	  champions”;	  Nedeva	  2012)	  pushing	  for	  integration.	  The	  
relevant	  actors	   in	  this	  respect	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  the	  research	  community	   for	  science-­‐oriented	  programs	  
(like	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   European	  Research	   Council),	   the	   industry	   for	   technological-­‐
oriented	  programs	  (industry	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  actors	  pushing	  for	  the	  development	  of	  EU	  FP;	  Banchoff	  
2002.	  
Given	  lasting	  differences	  in	  national	  research	  systems	  and	  policies,	  this	  process	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  selective,	  with	  
only	   a	   few	   countries	   displaying	   strong	   interests	   in	   a	   given	   domain	   –	   interestingly,	   this	   is	   likely	   to	  make	  
reaching	  an	  agreement	  easier,	   as	  no	  overall	   European	   consensus	   is	   required.	  We	   then	  expect	   large	   joint	  
programs	  to	  be	  characterized	  by	  a	  restricted	  core	  of	  countries	  promoting	  them	  and	  providing	  most	  of	  the	  
resources,	  with	  other	  countries	  joining	  with	  lower	  levels	  of	  engagement	  and	  at	  a	  later	  stage.	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3 Methods	  and	  data	  sources	  
The	  dataset	  was	  collected	  in	  a	  project	  commissioned	  by	  the	  European	  Union,	  which	  provides	  for	  the	  year	  
2009	   a	   census	   of	   joint	   programs	   in	   11	   European	   countries	   (Czech	   Republic,	   Denmark,	   France,	   Germany,	  
Italy,	   Netherlands,	   Norway,	   Poland,	   Switzerland,	   Spain	   and	   the	   United	   Kingdom).	   Since	   these	   countries	  
cover	   about	   85%	   of	   the	   total	   ERA	   public	   research	   funding,	   the	   results	   can	   be	   considered	   as	   fairly	  
representative	  of	  the	  European	  landscape.	  
The	  perimeter	   includes	  programs	   funding	   research	   through	  open	   calls	   for	   proposals	   –	   excluding	  national	  
collaboration	   schemes	   only	   allocating	   means	   for	   travel	   and	   coordination	   purposes,	   as	   well	   as	   direct	  
cooperation	   between	   large	   research	   organizations.	   Programs	  managed	   solely	   by	   the	   EU,	   like	   framework	  
programs,	  are	  excluded	  as	  well,	  while	  both	  European	  Union	   initiatives	   (like	  ERA-­‐NETs)	  and	  bi-­‐	   and	  multi-­‐
lateral	  cooperation	  between	  National	  States	  (including	  countries	  outside	  the	  ERA)	  are	  covered.	  
For	  each	  program	  a	  set	  of	  organizational	  descriptors	  has	  been	  collected,	  based	  on	  a	  closed	  list	  of	  categories	  
to	   allow	   for	   systematic	   comparisons.	   Data	   has	   been	   collected	   by	   national	   experts,	   validated,	   and	  
crosschecked	   by	   the	   project	   team	   and	   integrated	   into	   a	   relational	   database.	   A	   few	  programs	   have	   been	  
excluded	  from	  the	  analysis	  because	  of	  incomplete	  information.	  
We	  hold	   information	  on	  the	  start	  date	  of	  each	  program.	  We	  consider	  programs	  with	  status	  changes	   (like	  
ERA-­‐NETs	  becoming	  ERA-­‐NET	  plus)	  to	  be	  single	  programs;	  the	  change	  event	  has	  been	  coded	  specifically	  to	  
analyze	  program	  dynamics	  (see	  section	  4.4).	  
Program	   characteristics.	  We	  make	   use	   of	   three	   descriptors	   that	   detail	   how	   programs	   are	   organized	   and	  
which	   functions	   are	   integrated.	   The	   organizational	   structure	   (1)	   characterizes	   how	   common	   program	  
activities	   are	   organized.	   Four	   categories	   are	   defined:	   agency,	   when	   a	   supranational	   agency	   has	   been	  
created	   with	   an	   enduring	   status;	   coordination,	   when	   joint	   activities	   are	   managed	   by	   non-­‐permanent	  
structures,	   like	   joint	  committees,	  whose	  existence	   is	  specifically	  related	  to	  the	  program	  itself;	  delegation,	  
when	  the	  management	  of	  the	   joint	  activities	   is	  delegated	  to	  a	  national	  agency	   in	  one	  of	  the	  participating	  
countries;	  independent	  selection	  when	  evaluation	  and	  selection	  are	  done	  independently	  and	  the	  project	  is	  
approved	   if	   all	   parties	   decide	   to	   finance	   it.	   The	   funding	  model	   (2)	   describes	   how	  program	   resources	   are	  
managed.	  In	  the	  common	  pot,	  resources	  are	  managed	  by	  a	  supranational	  agency,	  whereas	  in	  the	  national	  
pot,	  resources	  are	  managed	  by	  national	  agencies.	  Furthermore,	  we	  identify	  those	  programs	  for	  which	  there	  
is	   European	   Union	   top-­‐up	   funding	   in	   addition	   to	   national	   contributions.	   The	   submission	   procedure	   (3)	  
identifies	  whether	  proposals	  have	   to	  be	  submitted	   to	  a	  single	  agency	   (single	  entry-­‐point),	  or	  at	   the	  same	  
time	  to	  agencies	  in	  the	  different	  participating	  countries	  (parallel	  submission).	  
Program	  domain.	  We	   classify	   programs	   by	   their	   policy	   goals	   –	   using	   the	   standard	  Nomenclature	   for	   the	  
Analysis	   and	   Comparison	   of	   the	   Scientific	   Programs	   and	   Budgets	   (NABS)	   of	   the	   Frascati	   manual	   (OECD	  
2002).	  We	  distinguish	  between	   three	  categories	   (Lepori,	  Dinges,	  Reale,	   Slipersaeter,	  Theves	  and	  Van	  den	  
Besselaar	   2007);	   general-­‐purpose	   and	   science-­‐oriented	   programs	   (program	   covering	   all	   categories	   and	  
general	   advancement	   of	   knowledge),	   policy-­‐oriented	   programs	   (environment,	   transport,	   education,	   etc.)	  
and	  industry-­‐oriented	  programs	  (industrial	  production	  and	  technology;	  space).	  
Actors’	  involvement.	  We	  first	  identify	  the	  actors	  which	  officially	  created	  a	  joint	  program	  through	  some	  kind	  
of	   legal	   decision	   –	   distinguishing	   between	   the	   European	   Union	   (all	   initiatives	   decided	   under	   the	   FP),	  
National	  States,	  when	  programs	  are	  established	  by	  a	  treaty	  –	  and	  funding	  agencies,	  when	  the	  program	  was	  
established	  through	  an	  agreement	  between	  agencies.	  National	  participation	  identifies	  whether	  the	  country	  
participated	  in	  the	  program	  in	  the	  year	  2009.	  Data	  has	  been	  derived	  from	  program	  descriptions,	  Websites,	  
and	   inventories	   like	   NETWATCH;	   from	   data	   on	   the	   national	   budget	   by	   program,	   we	   further	   identify	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participations	  without	   funding	  commitments.	  The	  same	  sources	  provide	   information	  on	   funding	  agencies	  
participating	   in	   each	   country.	   For	   comparative	   analysis,	   agencies	   have	   been	   classified	   by	   distinguishing	  
between	  ministries	   (research	  ministry	   and	   sectorial	  ministries),	   independent	   agencies	   (research	   councils,	  
innovation	  agencies,	  and	  sector	  agencies)	  and	  public	  research	  organizations.	  
Program	  budget.	  Data	  on	  funding	  flows	  were	  collected	  for	  the	  period	  2000-­‐2009,	  including	  information	  on	  
the	  country’s	  origin	  of	  funding	  and	  the	  funding	  agency	  receiving	  it.	  Data	  is	  based	  on	  2009	  perimeter:	  thus	  
the	   dataset	   does	   not	   include	   past	   programs	   which	   have	   been	   terminated	   –	   we	   do	   not	   expect	   this	   to	  
significantly	  affect	  our	  figures.	  The	  share	  of	  non-­‐available	  data	  is	  higher	  than	  for	  descriptors	  (18%,	  12%	  for	  
2009).	   This	   data	   allows	   for	   the	   calculation	   of	   the	   total	   program	  budget	   for	   each	   year,	   its	   evolution	   over	  
time,	  and	  the	  repartition	  between	  European	  and	  national	  sources.	  
Methods.	  Given	  the	  size	  of	  the	  sample,	  we	  employ	  descriptive	  statistics	  by	  constructing	  groups	  of	  programs	  
with	   specific	   characteristics,	   as	   well	   as	   cross-­‐tables	   between	   different	   dimensions.	   We	   generally	   prefer	  
medians	  for	  budget	  distribution,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  age,	  since	  the	  distribution	  of	  these	  variables	  is	  quite	  skewed.	  
For	  hypotheses	  testing	  we	  employ	  non-­‐parametric	  methods	  for	  comparing	  medians	  which	  are	  more	  robust	  
against	  non-­‐normality	  (Mann-­‐Whitney	  and	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis).	  When	  its	  assumptions	  are	  satisfied	  (all	  expected	  
counts>1	  and	  less	  than	  20%<5),	  we	  use	  chi-­‐square	  test	  for	  contingency	  tables,	  otherwise	  the	  Fisher	  exact	  
test.	  The	  corresponding	  null	  hypotheses	  are	  that	  distributions	  (or	  medians)	  are	  the	  same	  for	  the	  compared	  
groups,	   respectively	   that	   distribution	   of	   cell	   counts	   in	   contingency	   tables	   are	   the	   product	   of	   rows	   and	  
columns	  marginals	  (and	  hence	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  association	  between	  the	  considered	  variables).	  
4 Results	  
4.1 An	  overview	  of	  joint	  programs	  
The	  dataset	  includes	  91	  programs,	  whose	  total	  funding	  volume	  in	  2009	  was	  3.461	  billion	  Euros,	  i.e.	  3.42%	  
of	  public	  research	  expenditures	  in	  the	  considered	  countries	  (table	  2);	  23%	  of	  funding	  was	  provided	  by	  the	  
European	  Union,	  while	  the	  European	  Space	  Agency	  alone	  accounts	  for	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  the	  total	  budget.	  
42	   programs	   can	   be	   characterized	   as	   European	   initiatives,	   in	   principle	   open	   to	   all	   European	   countries	   –	  
including	   programs	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   EU	   policies,	   like	   ERA-­‐NETs	   and	   JTIs	   and	   intergovernmental	  
programs	   like	   ESA,	   COST,	   and	   Eureka	   –	   and	   49	   as	   bilateral	   initiatives	   among	   two	   or	   smaller	   groups	   of	  
countries.	  
[table	  2	  about	  here]	  
In	  terms	  of	  organization,	  14	  programs	  are	  managed	  by	  a	  supranational	  agency,	  64	  by	  coordination	  through	  
a	  joint	  committee,	  6	  by	  delegation,	  and	  7	  by	  independent	  selection.	  In	  terms	  of	  funding	  model,	  6	  programs	  
are	   characterized	   by	   common	   pot	   (2	   of	   them	   with	   EU	   additional	   funding),	   13	   by	   national	   pot	   plus	   EU	  
common	   funding,	   and	   72	   by	   purely	   national	   pot.	  Most	   programs	   are	   characterized	   by	   single	   submission	  
(62).	  
Only	  7	  programs	  were	  created	  before	  2000	  –	   the	  oldest	  being	  COST	   (1971)	   -­‐	  27	  programs	  between	  2000	  
and	  2005,	  and	  57	  in	  the	  years	  2007-­‐2009,	  thus	  documenting	  the	  growth	  seen	  after	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  ERA.	  In	  
the	   period	   between	   2000	   and	   2009,	   the	   total	   budget	   of	   joint	   programs	   more	   than	   doubled	   (+119%);	  
excluding	  ESA,	  it	  increased	  from	  34	  million	  Euros	  in	  2000	  to	  more	  than	  800	  million	  in	  2009,	  and	  more	  than	  




36	   programs	   were	   classified	   as	   generic	   (all	   topics)	   or	   oriented	   towards	   the	   advancement	   of	   knowledge	  
(investigator-­‐driven	   programs),	   while	   the	   rest	   could	   be	   attributed	   to	   a	   specific	   policy	   domain,	   mostly	  
industrial	   production	   (20	   programs),	   health	   (14),	   and	   environment	   (8).	   In	   terms	   of	   funding	   volume,	   the	  
industrial	   domain	   accounts	   for	   two-­‐thirds	   of	   the	   budget;	   industry-­‐oriented	   programs	   largely	   support	  
research	  in	  the	  private	  sector,	  whereas	  the	  two	  other	  groups	  are	  mostly	  oriented	  to	  public-­‐sector	  research	  
(table	  3).	  
[table	  3	  about	  here]	  
4.2 Identifying	  groups	  of	  programs	  and	  their	  relationships	  to	  ideal	  types	  
Descriptive	   analysis	   displays	   associations	   between	   organizational	   characteristics,	   which	   allow	   for	   the	  
identification	  of	  seven	  groups	  of	  programs	  (table	  4).	  Namely,	  all	  programs	  with	  agency	  and	  delegation	  are	  
characterized	   by	   a	   single	   entry-­‐point,	   whereas	   all	   independent	   programs	   are	   characterized	   by	   parallel	  
submission.	  Common	  pot	  programs	  and	  programs	  with	  EU	  top-­‐up	  funding	  are	  found	  only	  among	  programs	  
with	  agency	  or	  committee.	  These	  associations	  are	  statistically	  significant	  against	  a	  random	  distribution	  of	  
organizational	   characteristics	   (Fisher	   exact	   test	   p<0.05	   between	   organization	   and	   funding,	   p<0.001	  
between	  organization	  and	  submission,	  p<0.01	  between	  organization	  and	  EU	  top-­‐up	  funding).	  
We	   classify	   three	   ambiguous	   cases	   -­‐	   two	   programs	   with	   committee	   and	   common	   pot	   and	   one	   parallel	  
program	  with	   single-­‐entry	   point	   –	   based	  on	   their	   organizational	   structure,	  which	  we	   consider	   as	   a	  more	  
lasting	  feature	  of	  programs.	  
[table	  4	  about	  here]	  
Only	  four	  programs	  correspond	  to	  the	  ideal	  type	  of	  integration,	  where	  all	  competences	  are	  transferred	  to	  
the	  supranational	  level.	  Three	  are	  between	  groups	  of	  countries	  in	  the	  same	  geographical	  or	  cultural	  region,	  
namely	   the	   Nordic	   cooperation,	   the	   Visegrad	   Funding	   between	   Central	   European	   Countries	   and	   the	  
Iberoamerican	  program	  on	  Science	  and	  Technology	  for	  Development.	  ESA	  remains	  an	  exceptional	  case	   in	  
the	  European	  context,	  which	  should	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  field,	  namely	  the	  high	  level	  of	  
investment	  required	  and	  the	  level	  of	  internationalization	  of	  the	  research	  community-­‐	  at	  the	  European	  level	  
no	  other	  fully	  integrated	  programs	  have	  been	  established	  except	  those	  financed	  solely	  from	  the	  European	  
budget	  (European	  Framework	  Programs;	  European	  Research	  Council).	  
The	  second	  group	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  hybrid	  where	   integration	  takes	  place	   for	  all	   functions	  except	  
funding,	   which	   is	   coordinated	   among	   participating	   countries	   (figure	   2).	   7	   out	   of	   10	   programs	   receive	  
additional	  EU	  funding,	  and	  half	  of	  them	  are	  industry-­‐oriented.	  This	  group	  includes	  four	  article	  185	  programs	  
(Ambient	   Assisted	   Living,	   Clinical	   Trials,	   Metrology,	   Eurostars),	   and	   two	   Joint	   Technology	   Initiatives	  
(ARTEMIS	   and	   ENIAC),	   as	   well	   as	   two	   programs	   created	   in	   an	   intergovernmental	   framework,	   which	  
developed	  strong	   linkages	   to	  European	  policies:	  COST	  has	  an	  official	  partnership	  and	   is	   co-­‐funded	  by	   the	  
European	   Union,	   whereas	   Eureka	   manages	   the	   EUROSTARS	   program.	   Only	   the	   two	   European	   Science	  
Foundation	  programs	   are	   unrelated	   to	   EU	  policy	   and	  do	  not	   receive	   EU	   funding;	   interestingly	   they	  were	  
closed	  in	  2012.	  
The	  41	  programs	  with	  a	  committee	  and	  single	  entry	  point	  are	  near	  to	  the	  coordination	  type:	  competences	  
are	  transferred	  to	  the	  supranational	  level	  concerning	  the	  design	  of	  calls,	  submission,	  and	  evaluation,	  while	  
funding	   is	   coordinated	   between	   national	   agencies;	   the	   transfer	   of	   competences	   is	   limited	   in	   time	   and	  
managed	  on	  ad	  hoc	  basis.	  Most	  are	  ERA-­‐NETs,	  but	  this	  model	  has	  been	  adopted	  for	  bilateral	  cooperation	  as	  
well;	   these	   programs	   display	   a	   stronger	   focus	   towards	   policy-­‐relevant	   issues	   and	   (to	   a	   lesser	   extent)	  
science.	  Among	  them,	  we	  separate	  a	  subgroup	  of	  ERA-­‐NET	  plus	  programs,	  to	  which	  the	  EU	  grants	  top-­‐up	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funding	   in	  exchange	  for	  stronger	  national	  commitments	  –	  with	  at	   least	  five	  countries	  agreeing	  to	  commit	  
resources	  for	  a	  joint	  call.	  
[figure	  2	  about	  here]	  
Independent	  programs	  are	  near	  the	  ideal	  type	  of	  collaboration,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  transfer	  of	  competences	  
or	  coordination;	  a	  larger	  group	  is	  composed	  by	  programs	  with	  some	  level	  of	  coordination	  –submission	  and	  
evaluation	  are	  done	   in	  parallel,	  while	  a	   joint	  committee	  coordinates	  national	   funding	  decisions	   to	  ensure	  
that	  both	  partners	  receive	  resources.	  
Finally,	   delegation	   programs	   represent	   a	   specific	   setting	   where	   operational	   coordination	   is	   achieved	   by	  
delegating	   submission,	   evaluation,	   and	   funding	   decision	   tasks	   to	   one	   participating	   agency,	   under	   the	  
(restrictive)	  condition	  that	  funding	  policies	  are	  already	  aligned	  by	  the	  similarity	  of	  national	  funding	  schemes	  
(and	  thus	  where	  coordination	  is	  not	  required	  concerning	  funding	  policies,	  evaluation	  criteria,	  etc.).	  
This	  descriptive	  analysis	  shows	  that	  while	  ideal	  types	  are	  a	  useful	  analytical	  tool	  to	  represent	  the	  space	  of	  
alternatives,	  no	  dominant	  group	  can	  be	  observed	  (at	  least	  regarding	  the	  number	  of	  programs)	  and	  a	  large	  
deal	   of	   blending	   between	   types	   takes	   place.	   To	   better	   understand	   the	   underlying	   processes	   and	   the	  
functions	  in	  the	  ERA,	  we	  now	  turn	  to	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  actor’s	  constellations	  behind	  groups	  of	  programs.	  
4.3 Analyzing	  actor’s	  roles	  
Data	  supporting	  our	  hypotheses	  on	  the	  role	  of	  actors	  in	  launching	  joint	  programs	  (table	  5).	  
[table	  5	  about	  here]	  
First,	   we	   do	   not	   observe	   historical	   layering	   by	   type	   and	   thus	   there	   is	   no	   indication	   that	   a	   single	   logic	   is	  
becoming	  dominant	  (in	  terms	  of	  number	  of	  programs):	  in	  all	  groups	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  programs	  were	  
founded	  after	  2006	  -­‐	  committee	  programs	  with	  EU	  top-­‐up	  funding	  (the	  ERA-­‐NET	  plus	  scheme	  introduced	  in	  
2007)	  and	  delegation	  programs	  between	  funding	  agencies	  being	  the	  most	  recent.	  The	  exception	  are	  fully	  
integrated	  programs	  (including	  funding):	  only	  one	  program	  in	  this	  group	  was	  launched	  after	  2000,	  namely	  
Nordforsk.	   Full	   integration	  with	  national	   contributions	  was	  an	   important	  model	  before	   the	   launch	  of	   the	  
ERA	  (2	  out	  of	  7	  programs	  established	  before	  2000),	  but	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  significant	  afterwards.	  
Second,	   after	   the	   launch	   of	   the	   ERA,	   the	   European	  Union	   emerged	   as	   a	   central	   actor	  with	   37	   out	   of	   84	  
programs	  established	  after	  2000.	  National	  States	  were	  the	  only	  relevant	  actor	  before	  (6	  out	  of	  7	  programs	  
before	  2000),	  but	  kept	  an	  important	  role	  afterwards	  (22	  programs	  after	  2000).	  Their	  roles	  are	  distinct:	  the	  
European	   Union	   focused	   on	   initiatives	   with	   a	   higher	   level	   of	   institutionalization	   in	   the	   coordination-­‐
integration	  logics,	  whereas	  National	  States	  transitioned	  to	  lighter	  initiatives	  oriented	  towards	  collaboration.	  
Importantly,	   the	   advent	   of	   the	   ERA	   marked	   a	   deep	   change	   in	   the	   role	   of	   the	   latter,	   since	   4	   out	   of	   7	  
programs	  established	  by	  National	  States	  until	  2000	  were	  agency	  programs.	  
Research	  councils	  are	  a	  third	  emerging	  actor	  –	  18	  out	  of	  26	  programs	  established	  by	  funding	  agencies	  are	  
agreements	  between	  councils.	  Other	  types	  of	  agencies	  (innovation,	  sector	  agencies)	  remain	  bound	  to	  the	  
role	  of	  managing	  programs	  as	  delegated	  by	  National	  States.	  Expectedly,	  they	  mostly	  focus	  on	  establishing	  
science-­‐oriented	  programs	  (18	  out	  of	  26	  programs)	  and	  are	  somewhat	  more	  oriented	  towards	  coordination	  
–	   probably	   less	   bound	   to	   a	   strict	   definition	   of	   national	   interests,	   and	   more	   subject	   to	   pressures	   from	  
research	   communities	   to	   develop	   international	   coordination.	  On	   the	   contrary,	   no	   significant	   associations	  
are	   found	   between	   program	   domain	   and	   programs	   established	   by	   EU	   and	   National	   States,	   thus	  




As	  expected,	  European	  initiatives	  display	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  country	  participations	  than	  bilateral	  programs	  
and	  their	  number	  increases	  from	  committee	  to	  agency	  programs	  (to	  which	  all	  JOREP	  countries	  participate),	  
consistently	  with	   the	   increase	  of	   institutional	   pressures	   and	   incentives	   from	  EU	   top-­‐up	   funding	   (see	   also	  
table	  7).	  Most	  bilateral	  programs	  have	  a	  single	  JOREP	  country	  participating	  (together	  with	  other	  countries	  
non	  covered	  by	  JOREP),	  showing	  that	  participation	  is	  selective.	  35	  out	  49	  programs	  (and	  20	  out	  of	  26	  in	  the	  
collaborative	  area)	  are	  with	  non-­‐ERA	  countries	  (mostly	  China,	  USA,	  Canada,	  Japan	  and	  India).	  
Data	  confirms	  the	  high	  level	  of	  delegation	  of	  program	  management	  and,	  accordingly,	  emphasize	  the	  central	  
role	   of	   independent	   agencies	   in	   joint	   programs:	   70%	   of	   national	   participations	   are	   managed	   by	  
independent	  agencies	  or	  research	  performers,	  the	  only	  countries	  where	  ministries	  account	  for	  more	  than	  
half	   of	   the	   participations	   are,	   the	   Czech	   Republic,	   Italy,	   and	   Spain	   (table	   6).	   In	   more	   than	   half	   of	   the	  
participations	  (accounting	  for	  about	  60%	  of	  the	  funding	  volume),	   the	  decision	  on	  the	  budget	  allocated	  to	  
the	   program	   is	   delegated	   to	   the	   agency	   as	   well.	   National	   States	   do	   not	   simply	   delegate	   to	   agencies	  
managerial	  tasks,	  but	  also	  the	  decision	  on	  the	  level	  of	  resources	  to	  be	  committed.	  
[table	  6	  about	  here]	  
Expectedly,	  program	  domain	  and	  agency	  participations	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  stronger	  presence	  of	  research	  
councils	   in	   science-­‐oriented	  programs,	   sector	   agencies,	   and	  ministries	   in	   policy	   programs	  and	   innovation	  
agencies	  –	  confirming	  that	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  agency	   is	   largely	  driven	  by	  the	  alignment	  between	  agency	  
mission	  and	  program	  domain.	  
There	   are	   also	   differences	   related	   to	   establishing	   authority:	   among	   programs	   established	   by	   National	  
States,	   the	   share	   of	   participations	  managed	   by	  ministries	   is	   higher	   than	   average	   (31%	   against	   13%;	   the	  
difference	  is	  statistically	  significant,	  chi	  square	  test,	  p<0.001).	  These	  programs	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  
part	   of	   the	   foreign	   research	   policy	   and	   thus	   tend	   to	   be	   more	   located	   at	   the	   ministerial	   level.	   Second,	  
programs	   established	   by	   funding	   agencies	   are	   essentially	  managed	  by	   research	   councils,	   alongside	   some	  
public	  research	  organizations	  like	  CNR	  or	  CNRS.	  
Some	   patterns	   are	   also	   related	   to	   differences	   in	   the	   organization	   of	   national	   research	   policies,	   where	  
similar	  functions	  are	  allocated	  to	  different	  bodies	  –	  for	  example,	  participations	  from	  research	  ministries	  and	  
PROs	  to	  science-­‐oriented	  programs	  are	  mostly	  from	  countries	  without	  a	  research	  council,	  where	  either	  the	  
research	   ministry	   (Spain;	   Cruz-­‐Castro	   and	   Sanz-­‐Menéndez	   2007)	   or	   PROs	   (Italy;	   Potì	   and	   Reale	   2007)	  
assume	  this	  function.	  Analyzing	  the	  impact	  of	  specific	  national	  structures	  on	  participation	  to	  joint	  programs	  
is	  another	  relevant	  issue	  which	  could	  be	  investigated	  using	  this	  data	  (Reale,	  Lepori,	  Primeri,	  et	  al	  2013).	  
We	  summarize	  our	  findings	  by	  distinguishing	  between	  three	  groups	  of	  programs.	  
First,	  the	  programs	  in	  the	  integration-­‐coordination	  area	  are	  situated	  in	  the	  ERA	  space,	  they	  are	  promoted	  
by	   the	   European	   Union,	   while	   national	   participations	   are	   mostly	   delegated	   to	   agencies	   with	   a	   specific	  
mission	   in	   the	   program	   scientific	   domain	   –	   stronger	   levels	   of	   institutionalization	   translate	   into	   a	   larger	  
number	  of	  countries	  participating.	  Delegation	  of	  tasks	  to	  agencies	  implies	  that,	  despite	  national	  differences	  
in	  the	  organization	  of	  research	  policy,	  there	  is	  some	  level	  of	  homogeneity	  in	  the	  characteristics	  of	  agencies	  
participating	   in	   individual	   programs,	   associated	   with	   their	   policy	   domain.	   Importantly,	   agencies	   and	   not	  
National	  States	  mostly	  decide	  on	  the	  commitment	  of	  resources.	  
Second,	   programs	   established	   by	   National	   States	   are	   oriented	   towards	   the	   collaboration	   logics;	  
consistently,	   they	   are	   limited	   to	   a	   few	   countries	   -­‐	   collaboration	  would	   be	   difficult	   to	   apply	  with	   a	   larger	  
number	  of	  participations	  -­‐	  and	  focus	  on	  countries	  outside	  the	  ERA,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  specific	  pressure	  for	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integration	  coming	  from	  European	  institutions	  and	  the	  differences	  between	  national	  systems	  are	  larger.	  As	  
instruments	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  they	  are	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  directly	  managed	  by	  the	  ministries.	  
Finally,	   research	   councils	   are	   becoming	   an	   actor	   on	   their	   own	   in	   joint	   programs,	   specifically	   in	   science-­‐
oriented	  programs.	  The	  attempt	  to	  create	  their	  own	  European	  funding	  agency	  with	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  
European	  Science	  Foundation	   in	  1974	  did	  not	   lead	   to	   the	  expected	   results,	   since	  many	  national	   research	  
councils	   perceived	   the	   procedures	   as	   too	   complex	   and	   were	   not	   willing	   to	   commit	   resources	   to	   joint	  
programs	  managed	  by	  the	  ESF;	  accordingly,	  its	  two	  main	  funding	  schemes	  were	  closed	  down	  in	  2012.	  In	  the	  
most	  recent	  years,	  national	  research	  councils	  are	  establishing	  joint	  programs	  through	  bilateral	  agreements	  
where	  a	  smaller	  and	  more	  homogeneous	  group	  of	  countries	  participates.	  Novel	  forms	  of	  coordination	  are	  
then	   introduced,	  such	  as	   lead-­‐agency	  agreements,	  which	  do	  not	   require	   transferring	  competences	   to	   the	  
supranational	   level,	   but	   instead	   leverage	   mutual	   trust	   and	   similarities	   in	   the	   agency’s	   organization	   and	  
funding	  policies.	  
4.4 Budget	  and	  evolution	  across	  time	  
Since	  ESA	  represents	  an	  exceptional	  case	  accounting	  for	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  the	  total	  budget,	  we	  exclude	  it	  
from	  the	  following	  analysis.	  
As	   expected,	   budgets	   are	   highly	   skewed:	   the	  median	   in	   2009	  was	   only	   2.3	  million	   Euro,	  whereas	   the	   10	  
largest	  programs	  accounted	  for	  72%	  of	  the	  total	  -­‐	  the	  Gini	  coefficient	  being	  0.79.	  Among	  the	  90	  programs	  in	  
the	  dataset,	  only	  25	  were	  larger	  than	  5	  million	  Euro,	  while	  27	  were	  below	  1	  million	  and	  thus	  can	  essentially	  
be	  considered	  as	  symbolic.	  
[table	  7	  about	  here]	  
Table	   7	   confirms	   that	   levels	   of	   integration	   and	   EU	   commitment	   are	   strongly	   associated	   with	   budgets.	  
Medians	   of	   program	   budgets	   for	   2009	   are	   significantly	   different	   between	   groups	   of	   programs	   (p<0.001	  
Kruskal-­‐Wallis	   two-­‐tailed	   test)	   and	   between	   programs	   with	   and	   without	   EU	   funding	   (p<0.001,	   Mann-­‐
Withney	   two-­‐tailed	   test).	   On	   the	   contrary,	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   of	   an	   impact	   on	   program	   age:	   the	   two	  
largest	  programs	   in	   the	  dataset	  are	  old	   (ESA,	  1975	  and	  Eureka,	  1985),	  but	   the	  median	  budget	   in	  2009	  of	  
programs	   created	   in	   the	   period	   2000-­‐2005	   is	   lower	   than	   those	   in	   2006-­‐2009,	   the	   difference	   being	  
insignificant	   (Mann-­‐Withney	   two-­‐tailed,	  p>0.1).	   Furthermore,	   there	   is	  no	  evidence	  of	   an	   influence	  of	   the	  
type	  of	  agency	  participating	  in	  the	  budget	  –	  programs	  with	  participation	  of	  research	  councils	  (which	  have	  
larger	   total	   budgets)	   are	   not	   significantly	   larger	   than	   the	   average.	   There	   is	   however,	   some	   (weak)	  
association	  with	   program	  domain,	  with	   6	   out	   of	   the	   10	   largest	   programs	   being	   industry-­‐oriented,	  which	  
might	  reflect	  that	  European-­‐level	  networks	  have	  been	  preferentially	  constructed	  in	  this	  domain	  through	  FP.	  
Most	   of	   the	   resources	   are	   concentrated	   on	   agency	   programs	   without	   the	   integration	   of	   funding,	  
characterized	  both	  by	  strong	  integration	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  EU	  additional	  funding	  (reaching	  50%	  of	  the	  total	  
budget	   for	   programs	   like	   AAL	   or	   Joint	   Technology	   Initiatives).	   Smaller	   budgets	   and	   a	   lower	   share	   of	   EU	  
funding	  characterize	  the	  group	  of	  committee	  programs	  with	  EU	  top-­‐up	  funding,	  while	  programs	  belonging	  
to	   the	  other	   groups	   are	  much	   smaller	   on	   average.	  Ranking	  programs	  by	  budget	   in	   2009	  provides	   similar	  
results,	  with	  agency	  programs	  without	  integration	  of	  funding	  coming	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  list,	  followed	  by	  the	  
committee	   programs.	   The	   last	   four	   groups	   are	   composed	   mostly	   of	   programs	   with	   very	   small	   budgets,	  
alongside	  a	   few	  programs	  accounting	  for	  most	  of	   the	  funding	  volume.	  Consequently,	  European	   initiatives	  
(including	   COST	   and	   Eureka)	   account	   for	   more	   than	   80%	   of	   the	   total	   budget:	   in	   terms	   of	   volume,	   joint	  
programs	  are	  essentially	  a	  phenomenon	  related	  to	  the	  ERA.	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The	   analysis	   of	   growth	   is	   more	   difficult	   as	   most	   programs	   are	   recent	   and	   data	   for	   the	   past	   are	   less	  
complete;	  a	  comparison	  between	  budgets	   for	  the	  years	  2006	  and	  2009	  displays	  a	  general	   increase	   in	  the	  
median	  size	  of	  individual	  programs,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  funding	  for	  all	  groups.	  The	  increase	  is	  
larger	  for	  the	  agency	  and	  committee	  programs,	  which	  account	  for	  most	  of	  the	  growth	  in	  the	  total	  resources	  
devoted	   to	   joint	   programs.	   Once	   they	   are	   institutionalized,	   programs	   grow	   more	   rapidly	   in	   terms	   of	  
budgets,	  leading	  to	  the	  observed	  high	  level	  of	  skewedness	  of	  program	  budgets.	  
The	   analysis	   of	   the	   ten	   largest	   programs	   in	   the	   dataset	   is	   informative	   of	   the	   mechanisms	   driving	   this	  
process.	   All	   of	   them	   are	   European-­‐level	   initiatives,	   7	   are	   integrated	   programs	   without	   integration	   of	  
funding,	  2	  committee	  programs	  with	  EU	  top-­‐up	  funding,	  and	  1	  a	  committee	  program	  without	  integration	  of	  
funding,	  namely	  the	  EUROTRANSBIO	  ERA-­‐NET.	  
Eureka	  and	  COST,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  EUROSTARS	  program	  managed	  by	  Eureka,	  are	  broad	  umbrella	   initiatives	  
predating	  the	  ERA,	  but	  displaying	  a	  steep	  growth	  -­‐	  the	  budget	  was	  multiplied	  by	  11	  times	  for	  Eureka	  and	  5	  
times	  for	  COST	  from	  2000	  to	  2009.	  The	  reason	  of	  their	  success	  can	  be	  traced	   in	  their	  broad	  scope,	  being	  
containers	   providing	   a	   framework	   for	   individual	   initiatives	   (Eureka	   clusters	   and	   COST	   actions)	   related	   to	  
generic	   forms	   of	   collaboration	   (public-­‐private	   collaboration,	   respectively	   networking).	   The	   existence	   of	   a	  
stable	   setting	   based	   on	   intergovernmental	   agreements	   allowed	   them	   to	   function	   as	   catchments	   for	  
integration	  needs	  generated	  by	   the	  ERA.	  However,	  EU	   funding	  was	  critical	   in	   two	   respects:	  avoiding	   that	  
countries	   have	   to	   provide	   resources	   to	   operate	   the	   agency	   and	   providing	  mechanisms	   for	   participation	  
from	  countries	  that	  do	  not	  provide	  resources	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  COST,	  where	  coordination	  costs	  are	  supported	  
by	   the	   EU).	   Interestingly,	   the	   EUROCORES	   program	   presented	   similar	   characteristics,	   but	   the	   European	  
Science	  Foundation	  did	  not	  have	  its	  own	  budget	  and	  this	  might	  have	  been	  a	  reason	  why	  the	  scheme	  closed	  
in	  2012.	  
Six	   programs	   are	   focused	   on	   specific	   topics	   and	   share	   two	   characteristics:	   first,	   they	   went	   through	  
successive	   steps	  of	   increasing	   integration,	  and	  second,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   identify	  a	   core	  group	  of	   countries	  
providing	  most	  of	  the	  national	  resources.	  
The	   two	   Joint	   Technology	   Initiatives	   ARTEMIS	   (embedded	   systems)	   and	   ENIAC	   (microelectronics)	   were	  
preceded	   by	   the	   European	   Technology	   Platform	   with	   coordinating	   objectives,	   but	   no	   joint	   funding;	  
participation	  and	  support	   is	  concentrated	   in	  the	  countries	   for	  which	  this	   industrial	  domain	   is	  relevant	  (FI,	  
NL,	  FR,	  DE	  for	  ARTEMIS;	  IT,	  NL	  and	  DE	  for	  ENIAC).	  Three	  programs	  started	  as	  ERA-­‐NETs,	  two	  being	  upgraded	  
to	  ERA-­‐NET	  plus:	  NORFACE	  plus	  (migration	  studies)	  and	  ERASysbio+	  (system	  biology),	  are	  mostly	  promoted	  
by	  DE	  and	  UK,	  EUTRANSBIO	  (biotechnology)	  by	  DE,	  FR,	  and	  ES.	  Similarly,	  the	  European	  Metrology	  Research	  
Program	  started	  as	  ERA-­‐NET/ERA-­‐NET	  plus	  (IMERA)	  and	  moved	  to	  an	  art.	  185	  initiative,	  mostly	  supported	  
by	  DE	  and	  UK.	  Finally,	  the	  Ambient	  Assisted	  Living	  program	  started	  from	  the	  onset	  with	  a	  highly	  integrated	  
model	   as	   an	   art.	   185	   initiative;	   it	   is	   based	   on	   an	   European	   action	   plan	   and	   the	   interests	   of	   individual	  
countries	   –	   as	   revealed	   by	   the	   level	   of	   funding	   –	   are	   more	   similar;	   this	   might	   be	   a	   reason	   the	  
institutionalization	  process	  was	  more	  direct.	  
This	   analysis	   leads	   to	   the	   following	   conclusions.	   First,	   there	   is	   a	   strong	   association	   between	   forms	   of	  
institutionalization	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  level	  of	  resources	  on	  the	  other	  hand:	  joint	  programs	  reach	  a	  
sizeable	   level	   of	   budget	   only	   if	   they	   can	   build	   on	   lasting	   structures	   and	   commitments.	   Stronger	  
institutionalization	  translates	  both	  into	  higher	  starting	  budgets	  and	  more	  rapid	  growth	  over	  time,	  leading	  to	  
a	  very	  skewed	  distribution	  where	  a	  handful	  of	  programs	  accounts	  for	  most	  of	  the	  resources.	  The	  European	  
Union	  provides,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  normative	  environment	  promoting	  integration,	  regulatory	  models,	  and	  
financial	  incentives	  through	  EU	  top-­‐up	  funding,	  which	  help	  consolidating	  national	  commitments	  even	  under	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the	  national	  pot	  model	  –	  explaining	  why,	  in	  terms	  of	  resources,	  joint	  programs	  are	  essentially	  a	  European	  
phenomenon.	  
Second,	  large	  programs	  emerge	  in	  domains	  where	  a	  few	  countries	  have	  a	  strong	  interest,	  including	  some,	  
but	   not	   necessarily	   all	   large	   European	   countries.	   The	   individual	   cases	   displays	   that	   pressure	   for	  
internationalization	   comes	   from	   industry	   (ARTEMIS,	   ENIAC),	   public	   service	   needs	   (metrology)	   or	   specific	  
interests	   of	   research	   communities	   (NORFACE,	   promoted	   by	   a	   UK	   large	   research	   center	   on	   the	   topic).	  
Accordingly,	   the	   distribution	   of	   budgets	   by	   countries	   is	   quite	   skewed,	   with	   only	   a	   few	   of	   the	   countries	  
providing	  most	   of	   the	   resources,	   while	   the	   national	   pot	   mechanism	   allows	   other	   countries	   to	   join	   with	  
lower	   levels	  of	  commitments.	   Joint	  programs	  are	  thus	  a	  choice	   instrument	   in	  domains	  where	  the	   level	  of	  
interests	  of	  countries	  is	  highly	  variable.	  
Third,	   as	   expected,	   most	   of	   the	   currently	   integrated	   programs	   were	   started	   as	   lighter	   programs	   in	   the	  
coordination	   model	   and	   then	   progressively	   moved	   towards	   stronger	   forms	   of	   institutionalization.	   The	  
establishment	  by	  the	  EU	  of	  a	  set	  of	  instruments	  with	  different	  levels	  of	  integration	  –	  from	  ERA-­‐NETs	  to	  ERA-­‐
NETs	   plus	   to	   art.	   185	   –	   was	   thus	   a	   sensible	   strategy,	   as	   it	   allowed	   integration	   to	   be	   constructed	  
progressively	   -­‐	   unlike	   the	   intergovernmental	   approach	   based	   on	   treaties,	   which	   required	   stronger	  
commitments	  from	  the	  onset.	  
5 Discussion	  
Three	  limitations	  of	  this	  study	  can	  be	  highlighted.	  First,	  the	  coverage	  of	  the	  dataset	  is	  somewhat	  limited	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  number	  of	  observations,	  countries,	  and	  timeline.	  While	  we	  are	  confident	  in	  the	  robustness	  of	  
the	  general	  patterns	  identified,	  as	  we	  included	  all	  European	  initiatives	  and	  the	  largest	  countries	  in	  the	  ERA,	  
we	   acknowledge	   that	   extending	   the	   data	   to	   the	   whole	   of	   the	   ERA	  would	   add	   to	   the	   robustness	   of	   our	  
findings.	  More	  importantly,	  a	  limited	  account	  of	  program	  changes	  are	  provided.	  This	  cannot	  be	  avoided,	  as	  
joint	   programs	   are	   a	   very	   recent	   phenomenon,	   but	   by	   repeating	   data	   collection	   in	   a	   few	   years	   and	  
introducing	   a	   systematic	   account	   of	   program	   change	   and	   demographics,	   it	   would	   allow	   to	   extend	   our	  
findings	   and	   adopt	  more	   robust	   statistical	  models	   (such	   as	   event	  models).	   Finally,	   the	   focus	   on	   general	  
patterns,	   while	   consistent	   with	   the	   goals	   and	   research	   questions	   of	   the	   paper,	   disregards	   the	   specific	  
constellations	   leading	   to	   the	  emergence	   of	   individual	   programs;	   as	  we	   shortly	   outline	   in	   section	   4.4,	   the	  
two	  processes	   are	   largely	   complementary	   and	   thus	  our	   results	  open	   interesting	  paths	   for	  more	   in-­‐depth	  
understanding	  of	  individual	  programs	  development.	  
With	  these	  limitations	  in	  mind,	  the	  analysis	  provides	  substantial	  support	  to	  the	  hypotheses	  concerning	  the	  
relationship	   between	   ideal	   types	   and	   observed	   programs,	   actor’s	   roles	   and	   distribution	   of	   resources.	  
Moreover,	  it	  identifies	  a	  few	  substantive	  results	  of	  broader	  relevance	  for	  the	  ERA.	  
a)	  Ideal	  types	  and	  observed	  programs	  (H1).	  Overall,	  empirical	  data	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  variety	  
of	   observed	   programs	   can	   be	   associated	   to	   different	   underlying	   models	   of	   European	   integration.	   Two	  
findings	   are	   relevant	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   how	   logics	   drove	   practices:	   first,	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	  
coordination	   logics	   by	   the	   EU	   was	   central	   to	   foster	   the	   development	   of	   joint	   programs;	   second,	   the	  
availability	  of	  different	  logics	  and	  their	  blending	  was	  key	  to	  allow	  constructing	  programs	  meeting	  different	  
actor’s	  interests	  and	  which	  could	  also	  work	  in	  practice.	  
The	  coordination	  logic	  represented	  a	  true	  institutional	  innovation,	  since,	  at	  least	  concerning	  joint	  programs,	  




On	  the	  one	  hand,	  its	  introduction	  allowed	  for	  the	  launch	  of	  a	  larger	  number	  of	  programs	  (requiring	  limited	  
financial	   engagement	   by	   national	   actors),	   which	   provided	   a	   breeding	   ground	   for	   joint	   programs	   and	  
demonstrated	  that	  they	  can	  be	  an	  instrument	  for	  the	  integration	  of	  European	  research.	  We	  consider	  that	  
this	   partially	   explains	   why	   National	   States	   and	   funding	   agencies	   became	   proactive	   in	   this	   domain	   –	  
institutional	  pressures	  become	  more	  effective	  when	  they	  are	  materialized	  into	  practice.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  logic	  allowed	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  integration	  and	  the	  cooperation	  logic.	  
The	   former	   was	   no	   longer	   endorsed	   by	   National	   States,	   as	   it	   required	   transferring	   the	   budget	   at	   a	  
supranational	  level,	  while	  a	  weaker	  form	  of	  integration	  –	  where	  national	  budgets	  are	  coordinated,	  whereas	  
other	  program	  functions	  are	  integrated	  –	  was.	  Also,	  the	  pure	  collaboration	  logics	  between	  National	  States	  
(parallel	   programs)	   could	   hardly	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   response	   to	   internationalization	   needs,	   but	   when	  
blended	  with	  some	  coordination	  elements	  (a	  joint	  committee	  selecting	  projects),	   it	  emerged	  as	  an	  option	  
to	  develop	  joint	  initiatives	  with	  non-­‐ERA	  countries.	  
As	  foreseen	  by	  the	  theory,	  the	  availability	  of	  different	  legitimate	  logics	  allowed	  actors	  to	  avoid	  being	  stuck	  
into	  a	  single	  model,	  but	  to	  start	  combining	  them	  in	  order	  to	  devise	  new	  solutions	  and	  to	  find	  compromises.	  
While	  a	  first	  wave	  of	  programs	  (ERA-­‐NETs)	  was	  strongly	  associated	  with	  the	  coordination	  logics,	  with	  time	  
some	   of	   them	   moved	   towards	   stronger	   forms	   of	   integration.	   Also	   entirely	   new	   groups	   of	   programs	  
emerged,	  like	  lead	  agency	  agreements	  which	  combine	  some	  elements	  of	  collaboration	  and	  coordination.	  
Importantly,	  blending	  started	  at	  the	  level	  of	  practices,	  but	  then	  led	  to	  a	  redefinition	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  
logics	  themselves:	  the	   integration	   logics	  was	  reinterpreted	  as	  a	  model	  where	  all	   functions	  are	   integrated,	  
but	   the	   budget	   is	   only	   virtually	   integrated	   (as	   stated	   in	   official	   documents).	   The	   reinterpretation	   of	   key	  
concepts,	   like	   the	  one	  of	  common	  pot,	  becomes	  a	  key	  process	   in	  bridging	   institutional	   requirements	  and	  
actor’s	   interests	  (Thornton,	  Ocasio	  and	  Lounsbury	  2012).	  Accordingly,	   in	  this	  process	  what	  are	  considered	  
as	  legitimate	  integrated,	  coordinated	  and	  collaborative	  programs	  has	  been	  redefined	  in	  order	  to	  better	  suit	  
the	  specific	  requirements	  and	  actor’s	  constellation	  of	  joint	  programs.	  
b)	  The	   role	   of	   actors	   (H2).	   Second,	   our	   analysis	   shows	   the	   central	   role	  of	   agency	   and	  actor’s	   interests	   in	  
adopting	  institutional	  models	  and	  translating	  them	  into	  practice.	  By	  their	  nature,	  joint	  programs	  require	  the	  
construction	   of	   agreements	   between	   actors	   who	   have	   different	   notions	   of	   European	   integration	   and	  
interests,	   which	   in	   this	   respect	   meant	   that	   the	   possibility	   to	   combine	   elements	   of	   different	   logics	   into	  
hybrid	  models	  was	  critical.	  
While	   all	   actors	   involved	   in	   program	   funding	   –	   European	  Union,	   National	   States,	   and	   funding	   agencies	   -­‐	  
were	  responsive	  to	  internationalization	  pressures,	  their	  roles	  were	  redefined	  and	  differentiated	  during	  this	  
process.	   The	  European	  Union	  moved	   from	  a	   change	  agent	   approach	   (Nedeva	  2012),	  where	   it	   responded	  
directly	  with	  its	  own	  budget	  to	  internationalization	  pressures,	  to	  an	  incentive	  model,	  providing	  instruments	  
and	   top-­‐up	   funding	   to	   initiatives	   emerging	   from	   national	   actors.	   National	   States	   differentiated	   their	  
responses:	  within	  the	  ERA,	  they	  adopted	  a	  compliance	  behavior,	   joining	  programs	  where	  there	  was	  some	  
pressure	   to	   do	   so.	   Delegation	   of	   program	   management	   and	   decisions	   on	   resource	   levels	   to	   agencies	  
allowed	   National	   States	   to	   decouple	   the	   symbolic	   act	   of	   joining	   from	   the	  material	   side	   of	   participation,	  
which	  has	  to	  be	  selective	  because	  of	  limited	  resources.	  Outside	  the	  ERA,	  National	  States	  were	  proactive	  in	  
establishing	   joint	   programs	   with	   emerging	   countries:	   these	   highly	   political	   acts	   signal	   the	   willingness	   to	  
establish	   collaborative	   research,	   and	   accordingly	   they	   are	   mostly	   managed	   by	   the	   research	   ministries	  
themselves.	  
The	   role	   of	   independent	   funding	   agencies	   extended	   beyond	   the	   traditional	   model	   of	   delegates	   of	  
governments	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  policies,	  but	  did	  not	   imply	  the	  hollowing	  out	  of	  national	  research	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policies,	  with	  agencies	  bypassing	  the	  governmental	  level	  in	  order	  to	  participate	  directly	  to	  European	  actions	  
(Langfeldt,	  Godø,	  Gornitzka	  and	  Kaloudis	  2012).	  We	  should	   rather	   speak	  of	  a	  broadening	  of	   the	  space	  of	  
autonomous	  negotiation:	  agencies	  receive	  from	  the	  State	  a	  mission	  related	  to	  a	  specific	  domain	  of	  research	  
funding	  and	  are	  mostly	  endowed	  with	  a	  global	  budget	  to	  this	  aim.	  In	  their	  domain	  of	  competence,	  they	  are	  
in	   charge	   of	   arbitrating	   levels	   of	   resource	   commitment	   between	   national	   and	   international	   programs,	  
depending	  on	  the	  interests	  and	  needs	  of	  the	  research	  community	  (respectively	  of	  industry	  in	  technological	  
programs).	  
For	  research	  councils,	  this	  went	  as	  far	  as	  establishing	  new	  types	  of	  programs	  for	  themselves,	  (the	  delegated	  
programs	  based	  on	  lead	  agency	  agreements)	  in	  a	  domain	  where	  European	  instruments	  are	  perceived	  as	  not	  
well-­‐suited	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   academic	   research.	   After	   the	   failed	   experiment	   with	   the	   European	   Science	  
Foundation,	   research	   councils	   renounced	   the	   launch	   of	   European	   integrated	   programs,	   confirming	   that	  
without	   EU	   involvement	   they	   could	   not	   be	   stabilized,	   but	   rather	   concentrated	   on	   a	   specific	   niche	   not	  
covered	  by	  European	  programs,	   i.e.	  bilateral	  cooperation	  within	  the	  ERA.	  This	  move	  towards	  the	  bilateral	  
allowed	  them	  to	  be	  more	  selective	  concerning	  the	  partners	  with	  which	  to	  establish	  agreements,	  achieving	  a	  
greater	  homogeneity	  between	  participating	  agencies.	  
c)	  Distribution	  of	  programs	  and	  budgets	  (H3).	  Third,	  empirical	  results	  confirm	  expectations	  concerning	  the	  
concentration	  of	   the	  budget	   in	   a	   few	  programs,	   the	   importance	  of	   the	   selection	  process	   and	   the	   factors	  
that	  led	  programs	  to	  grow.	  
Further,	  they	  show	  that	  abandoning	  the	  strong	  integration	  model	  was	  central	  in	  this	  respect.	  Namely,	  this	  
model	  implied	  the	  launch	  of	  a	  few	  large	  programs	  based	  on	  binding	  commitments	  and	  secured	  resources	  –	  
like	  ESA	  and	  the	  EU	  Framework	  programs.	  Accordingly,	  creating	  strong	  coalitions	  between	  funders	  and	  the	  
involved	  research	  communities	  took	  largely	  place	  before	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  programs	  –	  and	  this	  was	  
possible	  only	  in	  domains	  where	  a	  strong	  champion	  was	  present.	  
The	  variable	  geometry	  model	  did	  not	  require	  this	  level	  of	  commitment	  and	  allowed	  the	  launch	  of	  a	  larger	  
number	   of	   programs:	   it	   was	   then	   more	   suited	   to	   the	   need	   of	   exploring	   international	   cooperation	  
opportunities	  in	  less	  strongly	  structured	  and	  homogeneous	  domains.	  However,	  if	  programs	  had	  to	  grow	  to	  
a	  sizeable	  budget	  and	  become	  durable	  entities,	  commitments	  nevertheless	  had	  to	  be	  constructed	  and	  this	  
process	  was	  highly	  selective.	   Joint	  programs	  then	  became	   learning	  spaces	   for	   integration	  rather	   than	  the	  
outcome	  of	  a	  previous	  integration	  in	  science	  and/or	  technology.	  
The	   analysis	   displays	   a	   few	   critical	   elements	   to	   this	   aim:	   normative	   pressures	   and	   incentives	   from	   the	  
European	  Union	  -­‐	  explaining	  why	  joint	  programs	  with	  a	  significant	  level	  of	  resources	  emerged	  only	  within	  
the	   ERA;	   strong	   interests	   from	   the	   research	   community	   or	   industry	   for	   the	   integration	   in	   that	   specific	  
domain;	   trust	   between	   the	   involved	   actors,	   consolidated	   through	   repeated	   interactions	   and	   successive	  
steps	   of	   integration.	   Trust	   can	   effectively	   replace	   binding	   regulations	   in	   managing	   joint	   programs,	   as	  
highlighted	   by	   delegated	   programs,	   but	   it	   critically	   depends	   on	   some	   level	   of	   homogeneity	   among	   the	  
participating	  actors	  –	  hence	   the	   importance	  of	  delegating	  program	  management	   to	  agencies	  with	   similar	  
functions	  and	  mission.	  
Finally,	  our	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  that,	  behind	  the	  establishment	  of	  joint	  programs,	  there	  are	  
the	  needs	  of	  societal	  actors	  towards	  internationalization,	  pushing	  them	  also	  to	  promote	  the	  establishment	  
of	  programs	  in	  their	  specific	  domains.	  This	  is	  not	  only	  the	  case	  of	  the	  research	  communities,	  but	  as	  well	  as	  
of	   industry	   for	   technology-­‐oriented	   programs	   and	   of	   public	   administration	   in	   fields	   like	   metrology.	   Of	  
course,	   in-­‐depth	   case	   studies	   would	   be	   required	   to	   better	   understand	   their	   role	   in	   establishing	   specific	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programs	  and	  how	  they	  interact	  with	  funding	  agencies	  (like	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  European	  Research	  Council;	  
Nedeva	  2012).	  
In	   terms	   of	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   institutionalization	   of	   the	   European	   space,	   the	   ERA	   represented	   in	  
2000	  an	  empty	   frame	  of	   reference,	  promoted	  by	  the	  recognition	  that	  a	   federal	  model	  of	  EU	  policies	  was	  
not	  endorsed	  by	  National	  States,	  while	  the	  intergovernmental	  model	  was	  not	  any	  more	  practical	  given	  the	  
number	  of	  countries	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  negotiating	  agreements.	  Our	  case	  study	  displays	  how	  in	  the	  following	  
decade,	   it	   was	   filled	   in	   with	   specific	   experiences	   and	   practices,	   led	   to	   the	   redefinition	   of	   actor’s	  
understanding	   of	   European	   integration	   and	   roles	   in	   European	   research	   policies	   and,	   ultimately,	   to	   the	  
emergence	  of	  original	  models	  of	  integration.	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   Integration	   Coordination	   Collaboration	  
European	   integration	  
conception	  
Supranational	   state	  
(State/federation	  model)	  
Confoederatio	  model	   Condominio	  model	  
Research	  policy	  scenario	   Concentration	   and	  
integration	  in	  transnational	  
arenas	  
Cooperation	   and	  
competition	   in	   multilevel-­‐
policy	  arenas	  
Decentralization,	   national	  
States	   as	   the	   dominant	  
actors.	  
Underlying	   rationale	   and	  
legitimacy	  
Achieving	  critical	  mass.	  
Fostering	   competition	  
between	  performers.	  
Promoting	   international	  
collaboration.	  
Subsidiarity:	   promoting	  
coordination	   and	  
competition	  while	   building	  
on	   national	   and	   regional	  
cultures	  and	  strength.	  
Promoting	  collaboration	  to	  
strengthen	   the	   national	  
research	  basis.	  
Organizational	  model	   Joint	   programs	   managed	  
by	  a	  supranational	  entity	  in	  
charge	   of	   all	   program	  
functions.	  
Variable	   geometry:	   some	  
competences	   might	   be	  
transferred	   to	   the	  
supranational	   level,	   others	  
remain	  at	  national	  level.	  
Ad	   hoc	   collaboration	  
between	   national	   funding	  
agencies;	   light	   and	  
transient	   structures	   for	  
joint	  decision-­‐making.	  
Resource	  management	   European	  level	   Coordinated	   between	  
European	   and	   national	  
level.	  
National	  level	  
Ancestor	   European	   Space	   Agency	  
(1975)	  
ERA	   Chemistry	   (2004),	  
MATERA	  (2005)	  
DEUFRAKO	  (1978)	  
Table	  1.	  Ideal	  types	  of	  logics	  in	  joint	  programs	  



















Figure	  1.	  General	  model	  for	  the	  emergence	  and	  institutionalization	  of	  joint	  programs	  
	   	  




Logics	  for	  joint	  programs	  





Launch	  of	  programs	  
Levels	   of	   participation	   and	  
engagement	  of	  resources	  
Groups	  of	  programs	  
Number	  of	  programs	  
Budget	  distribution	  
Pressures	  from	  




and	   prevalence	  
of	  logics	  
H1:	  joint	  programs	  can	  be	  related	  
to	   ideal	   types,	   but	   hybrids	   are	  
expected	  to	  emerge	  
H2:	   actors	   develop	  
specific	   participation	  
profiles	  
H3	   joint	   programs	   display	   a	  
very	   skewed	   distribution	   of	  
resources	  and	  growth	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   ESA	  included	   ESA	  excluded	  
Number	  of	  joint	  programs	   91	   90	  
Funding	  volume	  	   mio.	  €,	  2009	   %	  GBAORD	   mio.	  €,	  2009	   %	  GBAORD	  
Total	  budget	   3’464	   	   841	   	  
National	  funding	   2’663	   3.48%	   672	   0.87%	  
Additional	  EU	  funding	  as	  %	  of	  total	  budget	   23%	   20%	  
Table	  2.	  Key	  indicators	  on	  joint	  programs	  in	  the	  dataset	  (2009)	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Group	  of	  programs	   Subject	  codes	  (NABS)	   N	   Total	  budget	  2009	  
(mio.	  euros)*	  
%	  funding	  to	  
public*	  
Science	  and	  general-­‐purpose	   All	  categories;	  knowledge-­‐oriented	  programs	   36	   154.7	   0.87	  
Policy	   All	  other	  subject	  codes	   34	   148.2	   0.80	  
Industry	   Industry	  and	  technology;	  space.	   21	   539.4	   0.43	  
Table	  3.	  Groups	  of	  programs	  by	  policy	  domain	  
*Excluding	  ESA.	  The	  difference	  in	  medians	  of	  share	  of	  funding	  to	  public-­‐sector	  research	  between	  science/policy	  programs	  and	  
industry	  programs	  is	  statistically	  significant	  (p<0.001,	  Mann-­‐Whitney,	  two	  tailed).	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Group	   N	   Organizational	  characteristics	   Domain	   Geography	  
















Agency	   with	  
integration	  of	  funding	  
4	   Agency	   Common	   Single	   1/4	   2	   1	   1	   1	   3	  
Agency	   without	  
integration	  of	  funding	  
10	   Agency	   National	   Single	   7/10	   3	   2	   5	   10	   0	  
Committee	   with	   EU	  
top-­‐up	  funding	  
7	   Committee	   National	  (2)	   Single	   7/7	   4	   2	   1	   7	   0	  
Committee	   34	   Committee	   National	  (2)	   Single	   No	   11	   19	   4	   20	   14	  
Delegation	   6	   Delegation	   National	   Single	   No	   4	   2	   0	   0	   6	  
Committee	   with	  
parallel	  submission	  
22	   Committee	   National	   Parallel	   No	   7	   5	   9	   4	   18	  
Parallel	  programs	   8	   Independen
t	  
National	   Parallel	  
(1)	  
No	   5	   2	   1	   0	   8	  
Table	  4.	  Groups	  of	  programs	  and	  their	  characteristics	  
(1)	  one	  program	  with	  single-­‐entry	  point	  (2)	  one	  program	  with	  common	  pot	  (3)	  ESA	  excluded.	  Association	  between	  groups	  and	  
domain	  is	  weakly	  significant	  (p<0.1),	  association	  between	  domains	  and	  geography	  is	  highly	  significant	  (p<0.001;	  Fisher	  exact	  
test,	  groups	  3	  and	  4	  have	  been	  merged).	  
















Figure	  2.	  Groups	  of	  programs	  and	  ideal	  types	  
	   	  
Integrated	  
Coordinated	   Collaborative	  
Agency	   with	  
integration	  






Agency	   without	  







Committee	   with	   EU	  
top-­‐up	  funding	  (7)	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   Establishing	  authority	   Foundation	  year	   Country	  participation	  










Agency	  with	  integration	  of	  funding	   0	   4	   0	   1992	   11	   1	  
Agency	   without	   integration	   of	  
funding	  
6	   2	   2	   2004	   10	   -­‐	  
Committee	  with	  EU	  top-­‐up	  funding	   7	   0	   0	   2007	   5	   -­‐	  
Committee	  with	  single	  entry-­‐point	   20	   6	   8	   2006	   5.5	   1	  
Delegation	   0	   1	   5	   2008	   	   1.5	  
Committee	  with	  parallel	  submission	   4	   11	   7	   2006	   6	   1	  
Parallel	  programs	   0	   4	   4	   2006	   	   1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Foundation	  year	  (median)	   2006	   2007	   2007	   	   	   	  
Table	  5.	  Establishing	  authorities	  and	  founding	  dynamics	  
Number	  of	  participations	  refers	  to	  JOREP	  countries	  the	  maximum	  is	  11	  countries;	  most	  bilateral	  programs	  have	  less	  than	  two	  
countries	  participating	  since	  we	  count	  only	  JOREP	  countries.	  
Association	  between	  groups	  and	  establishing	  authority	  is	  highly	  significant	  (p<0.001;	  Fisher	  exact	  test,	  groups	  3	  and	  4	  have	  been	  
merged).	  Differences	  in	  medians	  between	  groups	  for	  foundation	  year	  are	  not	  significant	  (p>0.1),	  for	  number	  of	  countries	  are	  
significant	  (p<0.001;	  Kruskal-­‐Wallis,	  two-­‐tailed).	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Science	   8	   0	   19	   53	   19	   3	   3	  
Policy	   11	   5	   17	   33	   12	   11	   24	  
Innovation	   41	   4	   14	   13	   13	   12	   22	  
Table	  6.	  Number	  of	  participations	  by	  type	  of	  agency	  and	  program	  domain	  
Association	  between	  domain	  and	  type	  of	  agency	  is	  significant	  (p<0.001,	  chi-­‐square	  test).	  










above	  5	  mio.	  
euros	  (N)	  








Agency	  with	  integration	  of	  funding	   4.9	   1.5	   0/3	   0	   1.2	   0.6	  
Agency	  without	  integration	  of	  funding	   572.5	   36.2	   9/10	   45%	   201.7	   3.9	  
Committee	  with	  EU	  top-­‐up	  funding	   64.1	   8.1	   4/7	   14%	   6.7	   1.9	  
Committee	  with	  single	  entry-­‐point	   116.5	   1.5	   8/34	   0	   14.5	   0.0	  
Delegation	   17.2	   1.1	   1/6	   0	   0.8	   0.4	  
Committee	  with	  parallel	  submission	   45.9	   1.9	   1/22	   0	   29.5	   0.9	  
Parallel	  programs	   20.4	   2.3	   1/8	   0	   4.9	   1.0	  
Table	  7.	  Budget	  of	  joint	  programs	  by	  group	  2006	  and	  2009	  (mio.	  euros).	  ESA	  excluded	  
	  
	  
